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Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬀects of EU integration on intra-EU trade
volumes with a special focus on trade within and between the core
and the periphery countries. We ﬁnd that in all phases of integration
core-periphery and intra-periphery growth of trade has experienced
stronger positive eﬀects than intra-core trade. An extrapolation of
the estimation results suggests that intra-periphery trade and intra-
core trade will intensify in course of ”typical” additional enlargements
at the expense of core-periphery trade. This suggests that either the
old core will change or a second, new one may form.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
Since the early nineties, a new wave of regionalism has attracted interests
of both policy makers and researchers. In general, economists analyze the
eﬀects of (new) regionalism in terms of volume of trade2 and also of welfare
eﬀects.3 With respect to trade volumes, the literature on trading bloc ef-
fects typically concentrates on the Vinerian (1950) trade creation and trade
diversion. However, the eﬀects of regionalism and the formation of trading
blocs on intra-bloc received only minor attention. In particular, third-country
eﬀects within a trading bloc induced by bloc-enlargements are widely under-
researched. Krugman (1998, p. 115) points out that, especially, the develop-
ment of core-periphery trade within trading blocs deserves more attention:
”If there is to be a world of regional trading blocs, it seems likely at
this point that it will at the very least involve some distinction between the
advanced-country cores and developing-country peripheries within each bloc.
...; a crucial question would then be the division of gains within each bloc
between the core and periphery.”
In this respect, the formation of the European Union forms a prime ex-
ample, simply because it exists already for a fairly long time and it developed
quite dynamically experiencing four enlargements since 1973.4 Previous re-
search identiﬁed both trade creating and trade diverting eﬀects of the EU
1We should like to thank Alan Winters for various helpful suggestions.
2See Frankel et al. (1998), Sapir (1998), Krueger (1999), Sapir (2001), Soloaga &
Winters (2001).
3Krugman (1991a, 1991b), Frankel et al. (1996, 1998), Baier & Bergstrand (2001), etc.
4See Sapir (1998) and Soloaga & Winters (2001) for a survey of its history.
2integration.5 However, there is little to no attention to how the widening
(enlargement) and deepening (e.g., the Single Market Programme) of the
EU have aﬀected the diﬀerent country groups within the EU. Below, we in-
vestigate whether and how the EU integration process has exerted a diﬀerent
impact on intra-core, core-periphery, and intra-periphery trade relationships.
Noteworthy, we always treat the six EU founding members as the core and
the other member economies as the periphery.
Previous results on the EU integration eﬀects on trade follow the dummy
variables approach and, regarding the speciﬁcation and econometric method-
ology, they are potentially biased. Three sources of bias and mismeasurement
can be addressed. First, the EU is sometimes incorrectly treated as a stable
and time-invariant conglomerate of countries (compare Bayoumi & Eichen-
green, 1998, on this problem). Then, the time-invariant EU dummy variable
mixes up trade creating and trade diverting eﬀects, since trade between ac-
tual and future members is counted as EU trade throughout. Second, many
applications use cross-section estimation techniques (repeating OLS for each
period) although the underlying data cover large cross-sections and long
time series. Without controlling for the unobserved bilateral trade relation-
ship speciﬁci n ﬂuences, the estimated integration coeﬃc i e n t sm a yp i c ku p
eﬀects, which are not only due to integration but also due to geographic,
cultural, political and other time-invariant inﬂuences (compare Srinivasan,
1998; Cheng & Wall, 1999; etc.). Third, it is rarely taken into account that
trading bloc eﬀects cannot simply be captured by regional dummy coeﬃcients
in OLS regressions at all. Proper inference has to be based on the diﬀerences
5Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1998), Sapir (2001) etc.
3of the integration variable coeﬃcients before and after the involved countries
are joining the bloc (Srinivasan, 1998). Accordingly, the integration eﬀects
should be estimated by interacting the integration group eﬀects with diﬀerent
integration phase eﬀects.
The present paper concentrates on the intra-EU bilateral trade eﬀects
through both the formation and the enlargement of the EU over the period
1960-1998. It rigorously sets up an analysis of covariance model (ANCOVA),
which obtains reliable estimates of the integration eﬀects within a gravity
approach. The model controls for the endowment based New Trade The-
ory type inﬂuences (relative and absolute factor endowments) and for all
time-invariant and common cycle speciﬁce ﬀects. The integration process
is captured by a comprehensive set of integration phase×integration group
dummies, which account for phase-speciﬁci n t e g r a t i o ne ﬀects for each coun-
try group of interest in the integration process.6 In this set-up, the eﬀects are
measured with respect to a well-deﬁned reference group, which facilitates the
interpretation as compared to previous work. Following Srinivasan’s (1998)
claim, only the diﬀerences of the diﬀerences of these group×phase eﬀects are
interpreted as speciﬁct oi n t e g r a t i o n .
The next section describes the set-up of the model and the measurement
and interpretation of the integration eﬀects. Section 3 brieﬂyd e s c r i b e so u r
data set and presents the main estimation results together with the assess-
ment of the integration eﬀects. Section 4 summarizes the main ﬁndings and
concludes.
6We distinguish between the six EU founding members, the four diﬀerent enlargement
groups and the rest of the world.
42 The Econometric Methodology
We base our empirical analysis on a standard gravity model, which explains
bilateral trade ﬂows by relative and absolute factor endowments and trans-
action costs (Bergstrand, 1989). In terms of the covariates, we stick to Help-
man’s (1987) speciﬁcation:
logyijt = βGGijt + βSSijt + βRRijt + α + πkp + µij + λt + ²ijt (1)
with yijt as the bilateral real export ﬂows from country i to j in year t and
Gijt =l o g ( GDPit + GDPjt) (2)




























GDP denotes the real gross domestic product, POP is population, α is the
constant, π represents the integration eﬀects, and ² the traditional remain-
der error term. In analysis of variance (ANOVA) terms, our problem is a
nested design with two main eﬀects: the bilateral eﬀects (µij)7 and the time
eﬀects (λt), and πkp integration eﬀects, where the main eﬀects are nested
in. To capture the eﬀects of the EU integration on European trade, π is
designed to vary across integration phases (p =1 ,...,6) and across bilateral
integration group relations (k =1 ,...,35). All eﬀects are treated as ﬁxed for
conceptual reasons8 and to guarantee consistency. The inclusion of ﬁxed bi-
7We don’t treat the country pair eﬀects (say the France - Germany and the Germany
-F r a n c ee ﬀect) as symmetric. Therefore, on average bilateral trade is not necessarily
balanced in the considered period. We owe this observation to Alan Winters.
8We do not think about our sample of countries as randomly drawn from a large
population of bilateral relationships (see Baltagi, 2001).
5lateral eﬀects implies that all time-invariant inﬂuences, such as the typical
examples of transaction costs (distance, adjacency, common language, etc.),
are controlled for.
Phase 1 covers 1960-1964 (the pre-EU phase), Phase 2-6 refer to the
following time spans in the integration process at the beginning of which a
new group of countries entered the EU: 1965-1972 (EU6 or the core:B e l g i u m ,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands), 1973-1980 (Denmark,
Great Britain, Ireland), 1981-1985 (Greece), 1986-1994 (Portugal, Spain)
and 1995-1998 (Austria, Finland, Sweden). Noteworthy, the time eﬀects are
nested in these integration phases. We consider the rest of the countries in
the sample (i.e. the rest of OECD) as an additional homogeneous group of
countries. The comprehensive set of bilateral trade relations between these
integration groups is K =6× 6 − 1=3 5 , since one of the groups consists
of only a single economy (Greece). Similar to above, the bilateral eﬀects
are nested in these bilateral integration group eﬀects. Due to the nested
model structure, (1) can only be estimated by imposing an appropriate set of
restrictions on the parameters πkp, µij,a n dλt. Equivalently, one can exclude
one phase eﬀect, one bilateral integration group eﬀect, one year eﬀect and one
bilateral eﬀect, which is just a reparameterization of the problem (compare
Baltagi, 2001). Then, the estimated eﬀects represent deviations from the
excluded reference group rather than from the average group. We impose
the restriction that the bilateral eﬀects sum up to zero and we omit the ﬁrst
year (1960), the group of the bilateral relations between the rest of OECD
economies (neither of the countries there belongs to the EU in 1995 or later),
and Phase 6 (1995-1998) as the reference eﬀects. For our purpose, especially
6the latter two are relevant. The estimated integration eﬀects have to be
interpreted as deviations from Phase 6 and the typical trade relationship
between two rest of OECD economies. Time eﬀects represent diﬀerences
to the base year (1960), while the bilateral eﬀects are deviations from the
average bilateral relationship. We come up with 38 time eﬀects, 755 bilateral
eﬀects and (K − 1) × (P − 1) = 175 possible integration eﬀects (π)i nt h e
regression analysis.9
3 Data, Regression Results and the Assess-
ment of EU Integration Eﬀects
We use nominal intra-OECD export ﬂows (OECD, Monthly Statistics of
International Trade) in US dollars, export price indices (OECD, Economic
Outlook), nominal GDP (OECD, Economic Outlook and National Accounts
Volume 1) in US dollars, GDP deﬂators and population (same sources as
GDP) to construct real bilateral exports and the Heckscher-Ohlin variables
(G, S, R) as described above, with 1995 as the base year. The data set
comprises 22323 non-missing observations and it is unbalanced.
The size eﬀects are highly relevant and signiﬁcant at the 1% level (βG =
3.226; βS =1 .027), which is in line with the New Trade Theory.10 The
absolute diﬀerence in relative factor endowments exerts a negative, signiﬁcant
(at 5%) impact on bilateral exports (βR = −0.095) ,w h i c hi si na c c o r d a n c e
9In fact 11 of them cannot be estimated due to missing data. Compare the next section
for more details on the data.
10Compare Helpman (1987) and many other applications for similar results.
7with the Linder hypothesis but squares with the Heckscher-Ohlin view (no
gains from specialization but from similarity in the structure of demand, see
Bergstrand, 1990). According to the adjusted R2, the model explains 96% of
the variation in bilateral intra-OECD export ﬂows.
In assessing the EU integration eﬀects, we focus on intra-EU trade and on
core-periphery trade in particular. We deﬁne the core as the EU6 founding
members in each phase, and the periphery as the remaining EU economies, so
that the composition of the periphery changes from phase to phase. We base
our inference on the integration eﬀects on the appropriately weighted linear
combinations of the estimated group×phase eﬀects (π) in Tables 1 to 3.11
The corresponding weights are the numbers of observations in each bilateral
integration group×phase combination. As mentioned above, the estimated
eﬀects represent deviations from the base categories (i.e., the bilateral trade
relations between the rest of OECD countries and Phase 6), and the sig-
niﬁcance levels indicate, whether these deviations are diﬀerent from zero or
not.
> Tables 1 - 3 <
In order to provide a rich picture of the integration process, we decided
to present three diﬀerent aggregation concepts. First, Table 1 displays the
eﬀects on intra-EU trade of diﬀerent, time-invariant aggregates. For example,
the last row concentrates on intra-EU15 trade in all phases, irrespectively
of whether the involved countries participated in the EU in this phase or
11Weighting is necessary since, for example, the integration eﬀect on the intra-EU15
trade is an aggregate, which consists of the eﬀect on trade within and between all involved
country groups: EU6, ﬁrst enlargement group, second enlargement group, etc.
8not. Second, we look at the eﬀects on trade between the core EU economies
and other integration groups (diﬀerent enlargement groups as well as the
rest of the OECD; Table 2). Third, the eﬀects on EU intra-group trade
of the diﬀerent integration groups are considered (Table 3). On the basis
of the ﬁgures in Tables 1-3, one can obtain group-speciﬁc phase-to-phase
changes in the integration eﬀects by subtracting cells from each other within
rows. As mentioned above, only these obtained trade growth eﬀects can be
interpreted as pure integration eﬀects. They exclude the diﬀerences between
both the phase speciﬁcm a i ne ﬀects and also the integration group main
eﬀects. This is also in accordance with Srinivasan’s (1998, p. 117) claim
that ”the eﬀe c to ft h ef o r m a t i o no fat r a d eb l o ci sn o tt h ec o e ﬃcient of the
regional dummy, but the change in it in separate regressions before and after
the region formally becomes a trading bloc.” Note that this procedure is
equivalent to a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w eu s et h e s ed i ﬀerences and compare the integration-
induced trade growth performance between diﬀerent integration groups and
phases. This can easily be done by subtracting the obtained trade growth
eﬀects from those of another group in the same table. E.g., consider the
diﬀerence between Phase 3 and Phase 2 of EU9 in Table 1: (−0.202) −
(−0.673) = 0.471, which indicates that the phase-to-phase EU9 eﬀect is
positive. Obtain a similar diﬀerence for the EU6: (0.004) − (−0.229) =
0.234. The diﬀerence between the two estimated log diﬀerences amounts to
0.471−0.234 = 0.237.T h a tm e a n s ,f r o mP h a s e2t oP h a s e3i n t r a - E U 9t r a d e
has grown at about 100·(exp(0.237)−1) = 26.7% faster than intra-core trade,
due to EU integration only. We leave it to the interested reader to carry out
9other possible calculations on the basis of the reported information.
Below, we use the estimated coeﬃcients to investigate the following ques-
tions. Did previous enlargements foster core and periphery integration (intra-
core, core-periphery, intra-periphery) and how did intra-EU trade, core-
periphery trade and intra-periphery trade, always compared to intra-core
trade, respond to EU integration? Do we observe decreasing trade growth
eﬀects of the integration process? Are there any tentative conclusions, which
could eventually be drawn for typical further enlargements?
> Table 4 <
Table 4 enables us to answer the ﬁrst two questions. It basically reports
comparisons of the EU integration eﬀects on trade growth when moving down
the properly aggregated diagonals of the previous tables. More precisely,
”EU” and ”periphery” now refer to the member countries as observed. For
example, in the ﬁrst column of the table the EU consists of 9 countries, which
are treated as EU members in both Phase 2 and 3.12 This is the proper pre
and post entry comparison as suggested by Srinivasan (1998). Similarly, the
periphery consists of three economies (Denmark, Great Britain and Ireland)
in both phases as well. It is evident from Table 4 that in all phases the average
intra-EU country pair’s trade increased faster than the intra-core trade. From
Table 1, we know that the average phase-to-phase intra-core growth of trade
eﬀect was signiﬁcantly positive and amounted to about 5.9%. This implies
that the average phase-to-phase intra-EU trade growth eﬀect amounted to
25.4%, which squares with the results in Frankel et al. (1998), Krueger (1999)
12Note that the enlargement exactly occured in between Phases 2 and 3.
10and Soloaga & Winters (2001).13
The results indicate that EU integration leads to a stronger growth of
trade between the core and the periphery and within the periphery than
within the core itself (compare the second and the third row of coeﬃcients
in the table). Except in column one (comparing Phase 3 with Phase 2), the
intra-periphery integration eﬀects have been stronger (roughly by 8 percent-
age points) than the eﬀects on core-periphery integration. In this regard, EU
integration did not foster ”peripherality” in terms of volumes of trade ﬂows.
To some extent, this coincides with and complements Krugman’s (1991, p.
97f.) conclusion that we seem to be ”at the good part of the U, not the bad
[i.e. there is no deindustrialization of the periphery through integration] ...,
but that 1992 will actually favor peripheral manufacturing.” Indeed, we ﬁnd
that integration-induced core-periphery and intra-periphery trade expands
faster than intra-core trade during the whole integration process.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the EU history of integration has been ”success-
ful” in so far as it had not resulted in a hub-and-spoke pattern of integration.
I.e., inter-spoke trade has developed fairly well and there is no indication for
diversion from intra-periphery to core-periphery trade. Rather, the estab-
lishment of infrastructure and communication networks has also proliferated
integration between the non-founding member economies (the periphery).
The results identify a negative eﬀect of the southern enlargements (Greece,
13Frankel et al. (1998, p.97) ﬁnd that the within EU bias ”trend is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant”. Krueger (1999, p. 19) argues that ”If anything, there is an estimated marginally
signiﬁcant decrease in the tendency of EU partners to trade with each other over time.”
Soloaga & Winters (2001, p. 19) suggest that ”The gross-intratrade eﬀects for the EU ...
fall through time, but ... the changes are not signiﬁcant.”
11Portugal, Spain) and the so-called Eurosclerosis o nt h ei n t r a - c o r ev o l u m e
of trade growth. Whereas the ﬁrst two enlargements increased intra-core
volume of trade by 24.0% per phase, we observe an average reduction of
intra-core trade by 9.6% in the last two phases.14 However, there are no
detrimental eﬀects on the relative performance of core-periphery or intra-
periphery as compared to intra-core volume of trade growth. The results
also suggest that the last enlargement (Austria, Finland, Sweden) does not
yet show up in a come-back of positive intra-core integration eﬀects, which
might have two reasons.15 Either the deepening via the Single Market Pro-
gramme has not been strong enough a force vis-à-vis the widening process,
or it just takes a longer time span to develop its full power.
We can use the obtained ﬁgures to look at the possible eﬀects of further
enlargements on integration. Of course, we have to limit ourselves to a
projection, which relies on rather restrictive assumptions, especially, that
further enlargements are equivalent to typical previous ones. Hence, the
analysis below is not a forecast but only a thought experiment, which takes
the estimated model literally.
> Figures 1-3 <
Figures 1-3 extrapolate the trade growth eﬀects due to EU enlargements
on intra-EU, core-periphery and intra-periphery trade using third order poly-
nomials and the eﬀects from Table 4. Noteworthy, this experiment fo thought
should not be interpreted as a prediction. Rather, it looks at the impact
14Calculated on the basis of phase-to-phase diﬀerences in the ﬁrst row of Table 1.
15C o m p a r et h en e g a t i v eP h a s e6t oP h a s e5d i ﬀerence in the ﬁrst row of Tables 1-3
(= −0.064).
12of two hypothetical further enlargements under the assumption that these
are comparable to the average enlargement in the past.16 The ﬁgures sug-
gest that a ﬁfth typical enlargement should produce additional positive (i.e.,
larger than intra-core) integration eﬀects on intra-EU trade volumes as a
whole and, especially, on core-periphery trade. According to the projections,
a sixth enlargement changes this trend. Then, intra-periphery and intra-core
trade becomes increasingly more important than core-periphery trade. Of
course, this is cannot be interpreted in welfare terms and it does not imply
that any further enlargement is not desirable. However, it suggests that there
may be an optimal size in terms of the union’s potential integration eﬀects
on the volume of trade growth, given the single EU6 core.T h e i n c r e a s e o f
the intra-periphery trade eﬀects from any further enlargement supports the
view that an endogenous formation of a second core within the periphery be-
comes more likely. The periphery gets access to its full natural ”hinterland”
(compare Krugman, 1991, p. 86f.) and expands its activity at the expense
of the old core.17 In this respect and in accordance with Krugman (1991),
the results indicate that the present EU should not simply be viewed as a
single, homogeneous core (or hub), which only fosters its trade with several,
diﬀerent spokes in course of enlargements (compare Enders & Wonnacott,
1996).
16Noteworthy, the past enlargements have been considerably diﬀerent from the future
ones in terms of the number, the size and the characteristics of entrants. Our projec-
tion should not be read as a prediction, since the previous enlargements have not been
suﬃciently uniform to permit treating them as a single sample.
17A prime example would be Austria, which gets better access to the adjacent Central
and Eastern European countries.
13Another possibility would be an endogenous enlargement of the old core.
It remains a question for future research, whether a growing old core or the
formation of a second core emerges as a result from the EU enlargement
process.
4 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the discussion on the role of new regionalism for bi-
lateral trade volumes. It concentrates on the EU and, in contrast to previous
research, on the pattern of the intra-EU integration eﬀects with a special fo-
cus on trade within and between t h eE Uc o r ea n dp e r i p h e r y .W eu s eag r a v i t y
model and set up a rigorous, nested analysis of variance framework, where
the integration eﬀects are measured by a comprehensive set of integration
group dummies, which vary over integration phases. Equivalent to diﬀerence
in diﬀerence estimates, this allows the isolation of the EU integration eﬀects
on trade volumes as claimed in Srinivasan (1998).
Treating the six founding members as the core and the rest of EU coun-
tries as the (inhomogeneous and evolving) periphery, we ﬁnd that both core-
periphery and intra-periphery trade faced a stronger positive eﬀect from in-
tegration than intra-core trade itself. Hence, EU integration did not foster
”peripherality”. We identify a negative eﬀect of the southern enlargements
and Eurosclerosis on the intra-core volume of trade. However, intra-periphery
trade and core-periphery trade did not experience a relative disintegration
from this development. In general, the positive integration eﬀects seem to
weaken in course of the enlargements. Taking the model literally and un-
14dertaking extrapolations of our estimates in an experiment of thought leads
to the tentative conclusion that typical further enlargements are likely to
intensify both intra-periphery and intra-core trade at the expense of core-
periphery trade. In terms of the multi-region models of economic geography,
this could be interpreted as an implicit indication that either the old core
enlarges or a multiple-core structure evolves with a second core coming into
existence in the periphery.
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Note: The effects in this table are weighted averages of the corresponding group x phase effects.Table 2: Trade of the EU6 Core with Different Enlargement Groups and the Rest of OECD Countries
Partner group Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
1960-1964 1965-1972 1973-1980 1981-1985 1986-1995






























Note: The effects in this table are the corresponding, directly estimated group x phase effects.Table 3: Intra-Group Trade - Different Enlargement Groups
Partner group Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5
1960-1964 1965-1972 1973-1980 1981-1985 1986-1995









Second enlargement (GRC) -----









Note: The effects in this table are the corresponding, directly estimated group x phase effects.Table 4: EU Integration and Intra-Group Trade Growth
Integration group concept Phase 3-2 Phase 4-3 Phase 5-4 Phase 6-5
Intra-EU trade growth minus intra-core trade growth





F-statistic 137.57 131.83 96.43 35.56
Core-periphery trade growth minus intra-core trade growth





F-statistic 158.31 103.84 67.26 31.97
Intra-periphery trade growth minus intra-core trade growth





F-statistic 6.47 46.05 57.57 22.10
Note: The effects in this table are phase-to-phase differences between the weighted averages of the corresponding group x phase effects.Figure 1: Intra-EU Trade Growth minus Intra-Core Trade Growth Due to 
Enlargements and Third-Order Polynomial Projection
Figure 2: Core-Periphery Trade Growth minus Intra-Core Trade Growth Due to 
Enlargements and Third-Order Polynomial Projection
Figure 3: Intra-Periphery Trade Growth minus Intra-Core Trade Growth Due to 
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